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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of UCA
§78-2a-3(2)(j).

rv
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting Superior's motion for
summary judgment. (Record at 36-55).
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in
grantmg summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for
-v-

correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v.
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d
476 (Utah 1992) and Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah
1991).
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in weighing the evidence jn mis case?
(Record at 97-101).
Standard of Review In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in
granting summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for
correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v.
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d
476 (Utah 1992) and Pratt V. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah
1991).
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in viewing the evidence in this
case in a light most favorable to Superior? (Record at 97-101).
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in
granting summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for
correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v.
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d
-vi-

476 (Utah 1992) and Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah
1991).
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in denying Mr. Pett's Motion to
Strike the affidavit of Wendy Gittins? (Record at 75-83).
Standard of Review: In reviewing a motion to strike an affidavit, appellate courts
apply a correction-of-error standard. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768 (Ut.
App. 1997), citing State Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)
and Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 754 a 11 (Ut. App. 1990)
5. Did the trial court err in awarding Superior attorney's fees and interest at
the rate of 18% on the amount in claimed Mr. Pett owned in its complaint? (Record
at 97-101).
Standard of Review: In considering an appeal of the grant or denial of a summary
judgment, appellate courts review the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in a
light most favorable to the losing party. The legal conclusions reached by the trial court in
granting summary judgment are accorded no deference but, instead, are reviewed for
correctness. Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 p.2d 575 (Ut. App. 1993), citing Larson v.
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d
476 (Utah 1992) and Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah
1991).
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V
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
RULES:
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary
judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
-viii-

supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

-ix-

VI
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the trial court's December 20, 2006 "Findings, Order, and
Judgment" granting Superior's motion for summary judgment, as modified by the trial
court's memorandum decision dated December 28, 2006, and the trial court's denial of
Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins also dated December 28,
2006.
B
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Superior filed a complaint against Mr. Pett on February 1, 2006, claiming that he
owed a sum of money to it for services allegedly provided to Mr. Pett or on behalf of Mr.
Pett's family.
Mr. Pett answered the complaint on February 17, 2006, denying Superior's
allegations contained in its complaint and asserted various affirmative defenses.
The trial court sent a notice of intent to dismiss for failure to prosecute on July 21,
2006.
On July 31, 2006, Superior filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the
alternative for summary judgment(hereinafter, "Superior's motion"). In conjunction with
its motion, Superior filed a memorandum and an affidavit from Wendy Gittins.
Mr. Pett filed a memorandum in opposition to Superior's motion on August 18,
2006, and supported the memorandum with his own Affidavit.
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Superior filed a reply memorandum on August 28, 2006.
Mr. Pett filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Gittins (hereinafter, "Mr. Pett's
Motion") on September 5, 2006, and supported it with a memorandum.
Superior filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Pett's Motion on September 13,
2006.
On December 1, 2006, the trial court entered a memorandum decision granting
Superior's motion.
On or about September 5, 2006, Mr. Pett's counsel received the trial courts
memorandum decision granting Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
Mr. Pett's counsel did not file Mr. Pett's reply memorandum in support his Motion or
submit the motion for decision.
On December 20, 2006, Pett filed an objection to Superior's proposed order on its
motion.
On December 20, 2006, the trial court entered a document entitled Findings, Order
And Judgment, in which it stated: "The Court finds that the defenses raised in the
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disingenuous. "
On December 28, 2006, the trial court entered a second memorandum decision on
Mr. Pett's Objection to Superior's proposed order and judgment in its motion for
summary judgment and denying Mr. Pett's Motion, where in it again launched into an
examination of the facts, weighed the facts and again viewed the evidence in a light most
favorable to Superior. At the end of the memorandum decision the trial court stated:
This memorandum decision will serve as notice that the Findings, Order and
-2-

Judgment submitted by the Plaintiff have been modified on the first line under
findings to provide that:
"The Court finds the defenses raised in the Defendant's Memorandum in
Opposition appear to be without merit. " (Record at 101-104).
On December 29, the trial court entered an order denying Mr. Pett's Motion.
On January 29, 2007, Mr. Pett filed his Notice of Appeal.

C
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The plaintiff filed its complaint on February 1, 2006 asserting that it was the
assignee of Interwest Anesthesia and that Mr. Pett owed a sum of money to Interwest.
(Record at 3-6),
2. Mr. Pett filed an answer disputing the plaintiffs assertion that he owed
Interwest Anesthesia or the plaintiff any amount of money. (Record at 10-17).
3. On or about July 31, 2006, the plaintiff filed a "motion for judgment on the
pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment." (Record at 21-22).
4. On August 17, 2006, Mr. Pett filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the
plaintiffs "motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary
judgment," accompanied by an affidavit disputing the assertions contained in plaintiffs
"motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment."
(Record at 36-51).
5. The plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in support of its "motion for judgment
on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment." on August 28, 2006.
(Record at 57-66).
-3-

6. The plaintiff filed a notice to submit on August 30, 2006. (Record at 70-72).
7. The trial court entered its memorandum decision granting the plaintiff's
"motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary judgment" on
December 1, 2006, stating "The Courtfindsthat the defenses raised in the Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disingenuous, " (Record at 77-83).
8. The plaintiff prepared "findings^ order and judgment" and served a copy of the
"findings, and Judgment" on Mr. Pett's counsel on or about December 12, 2006. (Record
at 97-100).
9. Mr. Pett filed an objection to plaintiffs "findings, order and judgment" on
December 20, 2006. (Record at 101-107).
10. Even though Mr. Pett filed an objection to plaintiff's "findings, order and
judgmenf' within the time specified in Rule 7(e) and 7(f)(2) URCP, the trial court
nonetheless signed plaintiffs "findings, order and judgment" on December 20, 2006
without considering or addressing Mr. Pett's Objection to plaintiffs "findings, order and
judgment." (Record at 94-95).
11. Mr. Pett filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins on September
5, 2006, However, because he received the court's memorandum decision granting
plaintiff s "motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative, for summary
judgment." the same day he mailed his Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins,
he never bothered to submit the Motion for decision. (Record at 75-83).
12. On December 28, 2006, the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying
Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. The trial court also stated
-4-

that Mr. Pett was correct in its assertion that it was improper for the court to make
findings. Then, the trial court launched into a gratuitous examination and weighing of the
disputed facts of that case and proceeded to examine the disputed facts, make factual
findings concerning the disputed facts and viewing the disputed facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. After making its gratuitous examination and weighing of the
disputed facts, viewing the disputed facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
making factual findings concerning the disputed facts the trial court made the following
nonsensical statement:
This memorandum decision will serve as notice that the Findings, Order and
Judgment submitted by the Plaintiff have been modified on the first line under
findings to provide that:
"The Courtfindsthe defenses raised in the Defendant fs Memorandum in
Opposition appear to be without merit. " (Record at 101-106).
13. Mr. Pett filed his Notice of Appeal on January 29, 2007. (Record at 113).

vn
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court committed reversible and prejudicial error with it granted
Superior's motion for summary judgment. The trial court committed reversible and
prejudicial error when it weighed the evidence on Superior's motion for summary
judgment. The trial court also committed reversible and prejudicial error when it viewed
the disputed facts in a light most favorable to Superior on Superior's motion for summary
judgment. The trial court further erred and committed reversible and prejudicial error
when it denied Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike the affidavit of Wendy Gittins. The trial court
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also erred and committed reversible and prejudicial error when it awarded Superior
attorney's fees and interest at 18% on its motion for summary judgment.

vm
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL
ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY ONLY BE ENTERED WHEN THERE ARE NO
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THE CASE;
In pertinent part, Rule 56(c) URCP provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis added).
Additionally, Utah appellate courts have long and consistently held that summary
judgment can only be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and if the
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Jones v.
ERA Brokers Consol, 2000 UT61, ^ 8, 6P.3dll29; see also UtahR. Civ. P.
56(c).
Collardv. Nagle Construction, Inc., 57 P.3d 603 (Ut. App. 2002).
A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, Draper
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). Tretheway v.
Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 UT 12, y 995 P. 2d 599.
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Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete City., 42 P.3d 379 ( Utah 2001).
In Hebertson v. Bank One, 342 P.2, 383 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court,
quoting Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496 (Utah 1998), declared that: "Summary
judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See also> Certified Sur. Group,
Ltd. v. UTInc., supra, citing Taylor v. Ogden Sch. Dist, supra. "In ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, the court may consider only facts that are not in dispute. "
Sorensen v. Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978).
By definition, summary judgment cannot be granted where there are disputed
facts. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994)
("Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact
remain....n).
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc\, 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996).
In Christensen ex rel. Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377
P.2d 110, (1963), the Utah Supreme Court held that summary judgment cannot properly
be granted if the allegations in the plaintiffs complaint stand in opposition to the
averments of the affidavits so that there are controverted issues of fact, the determination
of which is necessary to settle the rights of the parties. In Holbrook Co. V. Adams, 542
P.2d 191 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court stated that "It takes only one sworn
statement to dispute the averments on the other side of controversy and create an issue of
fact, precluding summary judgment. "
In Sanberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Where the parties were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, but the
understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were vigorously
-7-

disputed, the matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only
be resolved by a trial.
Because the trial court improperly made improper and unlawful factual findings
and ignored the standard for summary judgment when it granted Superior's motion for
summary judgment, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Superior, as a matter of law.
B. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE
WHICH PRECLUDED THE TRIAL COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF SUPERIOR.
Because there are genuine issues of material fact present in this case, the trial court
erred as a matter of law, and committed reversible and prejudicial error, when it granted
Superior's motion for summary judgment.
1. Superior's Own Documents Establish That There Is A Genuine Issue Of Fact
As To How Much, If Any. Mr. Pett Allegedly Owes Interwest.
In its complaint, Superior claims that Mr. Pett owes it $1,299.05, with $627.04
allegedly representing the "Unpaid Principal " (Record at 6). In her affidavit, Gittens
claims that the principal amount owed to Interwest is $572.00. (Record at 30). However,
in Exhibit A, attached to the affidavit of Gittins, that Superior filed in support of its
motion for summary judgment, Interwest claims that only $317.57 was allegedly
transferred to Superior for collection. (Record at 34). Therefore, there is a genuine issue
of material fact in Superior's own documents as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly
owes to Interwest.
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett
-8-

allegedly owes to Interwest, the trial court could not grant Superior's motion for summary
judgment. Because the trial court granted Superior's motion for summary judgment when
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes
to Interwest, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and
reversible error, when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior.

2. Mr. Pett's Affidavit Creates Genuine Issues Of Material Fact That Precluded
The Trial Court From Granting Superior's Motion For Summary Judgment.
hi its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment Superior states:
On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a
payment, in the amount of $334.62 to Interwest Anesthesia. (Record at 24, f 9).
However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005. because on or about
February 25. 2006. Altius paid the Defendant $514.80. to pay for the services and
supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about
May 27, 2004. (Emphasis added). (Record at 24, % 10).
In his Affidavit, filed in support of his Memorandum in Opposition to Superior's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Pett states:
Gittins' claim, as set forth in paragraph 13 of her affidavit, that on February 25,
2005, Altius paid me $514.80, is not true. 1 have never received any payment from
Altius in the fifteen years 1 have been covered by their insurance. (Record at 54, ^f
9).
/ have no way of knowing ifAltius paid Interwest $334.62 on July 12, 2004, as
Gittins claims in paragraph 12 of her affidavit, however, I never received $514.80
from Altius on February 25, 2005. I would remember if out of the blue, anyone
sent me a check for $514.80, and if Interwest claims it did, where is the check with
my signature on it? (Record at 54, f 13).
Because Superior bases its claim that Altius retracted its payment of $334.62 to
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Interwest, on behalf of Mr. Pett, "because on or about February 25. 2006. Altiuspaid the
Defendant $514 80. to pay for the services and supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia
to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004, Mr. Pett's sworn statement, in his
affidavit, stating that he did not receive any payments from Altius in the entire fifteen
years he has been insured by Altius, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
or not the payment of $334.62 to Interwest, on behalf of Mr. Pett, was ever tcretracted. "
If, as Superior claims, the payment of $334.62 to Interwest, on behalf of Mr. Pett, was
only "retracted" because Mr. Pett allegedly received a payment of $514.80 on February
25, 2005, and Mr. Pett swears, under oath, that he never received any payment from
Altius in the amount of $514.80 on February 25, 2005, or any other amount at any other
time, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Altius ever "retracted"
any payment from Interwest, and thus there is a genuine issue of material fact as to what
amount, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes Interwest.1
Because the trial court granted Superior's motion for summary judgment when
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes
to Interwest, the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and
reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore,
this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior.

1. "It takes only one sworn statement to dispute the averments on the other side of
controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding summary judgment. " Holbrook Co.
V. Adams, supra.
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3. Superior's Assertion That Altius "Retracted" A Payment It Made To Interwest
On Mr. Pett's Behalf. Some Three Hundred Eighty-Four Days After Altius Made
That Payment To Interwest Is So Ludicrous That It Alone Creates A Genuine
Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Or Not Altius In Fact "Retracted" Any
Payment It Made To Interwest On Mr. Pett's Behalf And A Genuine Issue Of
Material Fact As To How Much. If Any. Mr. Pett Owes To Interwest.
On page 2, \ 9, of Superior's statement of facts, set forth in its memorandum of
points and authorities in support of its motion, (hereinafter, "Superior's memorandum"),
Superior claims that it was paid the sum of $334.62 by Altius on July 12, 2004. (Record
at 24). Then on page 2, If 10, of Superior's statement of facts, set forth in its
memorandum Superior claims that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier, Altius, uretracted that
payment on July 31, 2005.... " (Record at 24). However, Superior failed to provide any
evidence whatsoever indicating that Altius ever retracted any payment it made to
Interwest on behalf of Mr. Pett at any time, and it is completely absurd to assume that
Altius could retract a payment it made to Interwest three hundred eighty-four days
earlier.
Superior offers no explanation as to how Altius was able to retract a payment it
made more than a year earlier. Superior does not claim that Altius has access to its bank
accounts and/or the authority or ability to simply retract payments from Interwest's bank
accounts on its own, without any authority from Interwest.2 Therefore there is a genuine

2. In response to Mr. Pett's assertion that Altius did not, and could not, take money
from Interwest's bank accounts, Superior makes the absurd assertion that Altius offset the
money it paid Interwest, on Mr. Pett's behalf, from payments it owed Interwest for
treatment of others covered by Altius. In its reply memorandum in support of its motion
for summary judgment, Superior makes the following ludicrous statement: "Is it that
unusual of a concept that if Interwest did not send a refund check to Altius that Altius
would of-set the amount against another account. " (Record at 62).
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question of fact if and how Altius could have "retracted that payment on July 31,
2005..., " as Superior claims.
There is simply no evidence that Altius ever "retracted" the payment to Interwest,
that Superior admits Altius made to Interwest. Gittins' self-serving allegations, set forth
in her affidavit, do not establish that Altius ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest,
and, likewise, the alleged "Patient Ledger Analysis" does not establish as a matter of fact
that Altius ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest. If Superior is going to claim that
Altius "retracted" any payment to Interwest, it must provide proof in the form of bank
statements showing that the payment, that it admits Interwest received from Altius, was in
fact ever "retracted, " as Superior claims.3
Is it that unusual of a concept that if Justice Orme's check is returned by his bank
for non sufficient funds that Smiths would collect the amount of Justice Orme's check
against Justice Billings' account because Justice Orme and Justice Billings have accounts
at the same bank? Such an assertions is simply inane!
If Superior has any evidence that Altius ever "retracted" any payment to
Interwest, then Superior was required to provide that evidence to the trial court and Mr.
Pett. It did not do so, because it has no such evidence, and, therefore, it cannot do so,
because Altius did not and could not "retract" any payment it made to Interwest 384
days after making the payment.
3. Exhibit A to Gittins5 affidavit, termed a "Patient Ledger Analysis, " appears to be a
document created expressly for purposes of this litigation, rather than a document that is
prepared and kept in the ordinary course of business; therefore, the validity and accuracy
of it are suspect at best. This is especially true because the entries in Exhibit A are not in
chronological order. The last four entries on page two of the "Patient Ledger Analysis, "
are dated 6/10/2004, 7/12/2004, 9/1/2004, and 10/1/2005. Those entries follow twelve
entries in 2005 on page one of the "Patient Ledger Analysis, " ending with the last entry
on 9/1/2005. If the "Patient Ledger Analysis " was a real business record prepared by
Interwest at the time the entries allegedly made and kept in the ordinary course of
business, the "Patient Ledger Analysis " would be in chronological order. The fact that
they are not clearly establishes that the "Patient Ledger Analysis " is a document created
expressly for purposes of litigation, rather than a document that is prepared and kept in
-12-

Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the money
Altius paid to Interwest was in fact "retracted, " there is a genuine issue of fact as to how
much, if any, Mr. Pett owes to Interwest. Therefore as a matter of law, the trial court
erred, and committed prejudicial and reversible error, when it granted Superior's motion
for summary judgment, and, as a matter of law, this Court must reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior.

C: BECAUSE SUPERIOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A party is only entitled to summary judgment if, in addition to there being no
genuine issues of material fact in a case, the party moving for summary is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c) URCP: "The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis
added). See. Collardv. Nagle Construction, Inc., Hebertson v. Bank One, Parker v.
Dodgion, CertifiedSur. Group, Ltd. v. UTInc., and Taylor v. OgdenSch. Dist, supra.

the ordinary course of business. Therefore, anything contained in it, and any reference to
it, should have been ignored when the trial court ruled on Superior's motion for summary
judgment, because Gittins did not provide a foundation establishing the "Patient Ledger
Analysis" to be a business record, and could not provide a foundation establishing the
"Patient Ledger Analysis" to be a business record, because the "Patient Ledger
Analysis " is a document created expressly for purposes of this litigation, rather than a
document that is prepared and kept in the ordinary course of business.
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In the instant matter, Superior was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law, because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pert
owes to Interwest. Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court was not permitted to grant
Superior's motion for summary judgment, and this Court, as a matter of law, must reverse
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior.

POINT H
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT WEIGHED THE FACTS
ON SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
It is an undeniable fact that, under clear and controlling Utah law, a trial court
cannot weigh the facts on a motion for summary judgment and/or determine what the
facts of the case are.
A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists. Draper
City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) ("On a motion for
summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole
inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist")....
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete City., supra.
In Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated that a motion
for summary judgment can "never be used to determine what the facts are, but only to
ascertain whether there are any material issues of fact in dispute." See also. W,M.
Barnes Co. V. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981) holding "On a
motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate for a court to weigh disputed
evidence concerning such factors, " znASporv. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740
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P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987), declaring: "the sole inquiry to be determined is whether there is
a material issue of fact to be decided. "
In Singlketib v, Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967), the Utah
Supreme Court declared that a "Court cannot consider weight of testimony or credibility
of witness on motion for summary judgment; court simply determines that there is no
disputed issues of material fact and that as a matter of law one party should prevail "
It will be noted that a summary judgment can be granted only when it is shown
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
also is entitled to judgment as a matter of law under those facts. The court cannot
consider the weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering a
motion for summary judgment. He simply determines that there is no disputed
issue of material fact and that as a matter of law a party should prevail
LI.
However, inasmuch as the party moved against is being defeated without the
privilege of a trial, the court should carefully scrutinize the ''submissions " and
contentions he makes thereon to see if his contentions and proposals as to proof of
material facts, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to prevail; and if it so
appears, the motion for summary judgment should be denied and a trial should be
hadfor the purpose of resolving the disputed issues of fact and determining the
rights of the parties.
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976), citing Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v.
United Resources Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165 (Utah 1970).
In the instant matter, the trial court improperly and unlawfully weighed the alleged
evidence and made improper and unlawful factual determinations concerning the alleged
evidence in the case. In its memorandum decision dated December 28, 2006, the trial
court made the following statements in a pathetic attempt to justify its memorandum
decision dated December 1, 2006, wherein it stated that Superior's motion for summary

-15-

judgment was granted "for the reasons set forth in the Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points
and Authorities and in its Reply Memorandum, the motion is granted"
In its memorandum decision of December 28, 2006 the trial court stated:
A statement of facts must be supported by an affidavit, and moreover, must be
material or facts pertinent to the issue at hand to preclude summary judgment
Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's statement go to some of the
underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether Defendant is
indebtedfor services received. (Emphasis added), (Record at 102).
Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services
provided to Mr. Pettfr.daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to
summary judgment Yet there is no issue of fact with respect to that The fact
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not
reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier could or would
retract a payment it made to Intern? est 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no
explanation as to how Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier was able to retract a payment
it made more than a year earlier, " does not necessarily raise an issue of fact
Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier retracted a payment
does not raise a material issue of fact that Defendant is not obligatedfor the
alleged debt (Emphasis added), (Record at 103).
To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant
is indebted and owes for the services provided. (Emphasis added), (Record at 103).
The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to
whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his
underlying obligation. (Emphasis added), (Record at 103).
By stating:
Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's statement go to some of the
underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether Defendant is
indebtedfor services received,
the trial court admits that Mr. Pett's affidavit disputes the factual allegations contained in
Superior's memorandum. However, the trial court then weighs the statements contained
in Mr. Pett's affidavit and the statements in Superior's memorandum and improperly
-16-

ews the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Superior, while completely
ignoring facts Mr. Pett's affidavit establishes that there is a genuine dispute to that
amount, if any, Mr. Pett owes Interwest.
By stating:
Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services
provided to Mr. Pett 9s daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to
summary judgment. Yet there is no issue of fact with respect to that. The fact
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not
reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier could or would
retract a payment it made to Interwest 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no
explanation as to how Mr. Pett's insurance carrier was able to retract a payment
it made more than a year earlier, " does not necessarily raise an issue of fact
Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier, (Emphasis added)
the trial court admits that there is a genuine issue of fact as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett
owes Interwest.
The trial court stated:
Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services provided to Mr.
Pett's daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment
Yet, there is no issue of fact with respect to that
Then in a most incredible leap of illogical, irrational, unreasonable, fallacious, and
specious lack of reasoning, the trial court states the fact that Superior admits that Altius
paid Interwest for the service allegedly rendered on behalf of Mr. Pett's daughter "does
not necessarily raise an issue offacf as to how much, if any, Mr. Pett allegedly owes
Interwest. That assertion is so inane it defies description, and it is an impermissible
weighing of factual disputes and viewing the disputed facts in the light most favorable to
Superior.
The trial court's statement that:
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To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant
is indebted and owes for the services provided,
is another statement that is so ludicrous it defies all logic and reason. The trial court first
admits that Interwest may have been paid by Altius for any services it alleged rendered on
behalf of Mr. Pett and then states that the fact that Interwest may have been paid "does
not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant is indebted and owes for the
services provided. " That assertion is so inane it defies description, and it is an
impermissible weighing of factual disputes and viewing the disputed facts in the light
most favorable to Superior.
The trial court's assertion that:
The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to
whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his
underlying obligation,
is also so ludicrous it defies all logic and reason. The trial court admits that there is an
issue as to whether or not Interwest was paid for any services it allegedly provided on
behalf of Mr. Pett, but then states that the fact that Interwest may have been paid for
those services is irrelevant and does not create an issue of fact as to how much, if any,
Mr. Pett may owe Interwest. That assertion is so also inane it defies description, and it is
an impermissible weighing of factual disputes and viewing the disputed facts in the light
most favorable to Superior.
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully weighed the alleged evidence
and made improper and unlawful factual determinations concerning the evidence in the
case, the trial court eired as a matter of law and committed reversible and prejudicial
-18-

error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of
law, this Court must reverse the trial courts grant of summary judgment in favor of
Superior.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT VIEWED THE
ALLEGED EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
SUPERIOR.
Utah appellate courts have also consistently and repeatedly held that, on a motion
for summary judgment, a trial court is required to view all disputed factual allegations in
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc.,
supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court should not weigh disputed
evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exist. ").
viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. (Emphasis added).
In Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Barman, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah, 1966), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
A motion for summary judgment is a harsh measure, andfor such reason
contentions of party opposing the motion must be considered in a light most
advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in favor of permitting him to go to
trial and motion should be granted only when, viewing the matter thusly, no right
to recovery could be established. (Emphasis added).
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and courts should be reluctant to deprive
litigants of an opportunity to fully present their contentions upon a trial, and
therefore, summary judgment should be granted only when under the facts viewed
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff he could not recover as a matter of law.
(Emphasis added).
Welchman v. Wood, 337 P.2d 410 (Utah, 1959).
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In the instant matter, the trial court not only improperly and unlawfully weighed
the alleged facts in this case, but it also undisputedly viewed the alleged facts in a light
most favorable to Superior when it considered and ruled on Superior's motion for
summary judgment. As set forth in Point II of this brief, when the trial court made the
following inane conclusions, it not only improperly and unlawfully weighed the disputed
facts in this case, it also viewed those disputed facts in a light most favorable to superior:
A statement of facts must be supported by an affidavit and moreover, must be
material or facts pertinent to the issue at hand to preclude summary judgment
Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's statement go to some of the
underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether Defendant is
indebtedfor services received. (Emphasis added).
Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was paid for the medical services
provided to Mr. Pett 's daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to
summary judgment Yet, there is no issue of fact with respect to that The fact
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not
reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett 9s insurance carrier could or would
retract a payment it made to Interwest 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no
explanation as to how Mr. Pett's insurance carrier was able to retract a payment
it made more than a year earlier, " does not necessarily raise an issue of fact.
Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier retracted a payment
does not raise a material issue of fact that Defendant is not obligatedfor the
alleged debt (Emphasis added).
To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant
is indebted and owes for the services provided. (Emphasis added).
The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to
whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his
underlying obligation. (Emphasis added).
Because the trial court is prohibited by clear and controlling Utah law from
weighing facts and because the trial court was required to view all disputed facts in a
light most favorable to Mr. Pett, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error
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when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of law,
this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF
WENDY GITTINS AND THEN RELIED ON HER AFFIDAVIT IN RULING ON
SUPERIOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In pertinent part, Rule 56(e) URCP, (hereinafter "Rule 56"), provides as follows:
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or
served therewith. (Emphasis added).
Gittins' affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56(€) URCP.
Therefore, the trial court was required to strike it and not rely on it when ruling on
Superior's motion for summary judgment.
In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: tlBasedupon my personal
knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant 's account in this matter, I have
determined the following:" (Record, at 30).
In paragraph 4, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about May 27, 2004,
Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the defendant's daughter, in Cache County, State
of Utah obtained services and supplies from Interwest Anesthesia, and the principal
charge was $572. 00. " (Record, at 30).
In paragraph 5, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant promised to
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pay for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the "Agreement"). (Record, at
30).
In paragraph 6, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides
that among other services that may be provided are anesthesia. " (Record, at 30).
In paragraph 7, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides
that Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and supplies, he is liable for interest
at 18% per annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which includes a collection fee,
and attorney 'sfees incurred in the collection process. " (Record, at 30).
In paragraph 8, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement states under
paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies
rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates andfinancial policies in effect at the
time of service. " (Record, at 30).
In paragraph 9, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Paragraph 3 states: "I
understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not covered by my insurance
policy(s). " (Record, at 30).
In paragraph 10, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Per the terms of the
Agreement, and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is made whole, a
collection charge was added to the account in the amount of $317.57prior to referral to
Superior. " (Record, at 30).
In paragraph 11, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant breached
the Agreement by not paying for the services and supplies. " (Record, at 31).
In paragraph 12, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about July 12, 2004
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the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a payment, in the amount of $334.62, to
Interwest Anesthesia. " (Record, at 31).
In paragraph 13, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "However, Altius retracted
that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about February 25, 2005, Altius paid the
Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia
to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. " (Record, at 31).
In paragraph 14, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "We sent statements to the
Defendant on a regular basis. On the account statement, when there is a finance charge,
those dates that we sent statements. Finally, on September 2005, Interwest Anesthesia
sent a precollection letter to the defendant, which included a copy of the account
statement to day, requesting payment. " (Record, at 31).
In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal
knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant 9s account in this matter... " (Record, at
31). Gittins' memory and review of the Defendant's account is not personal knowledge
as mandated by Rule 56. Gittins' "review of the Defendant 's account in this matter"
does not qualify as personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56(e). While Mr. Pett's
account, so long as it contains only documents prepared and kept in the ordinary course
of business may be admissible, that fact does not mean that Mr. Pett's account is within
Gittins' personal knowledge, and Gittins cannot testify from personal knowledge and
base her affidavit on her personal interpretation of the alleged contents of Mr. Pett's
account. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based on her alleged "review of the
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Defendant 's account in this matter,,. " is improper testimony in an affidavit and it should
have been stricken by the trial court.
Likewise, any of Gittins' statements in her Affidavit based on her alleged "review
of the Defendant ls account in this matter,., "must be stricken because her affidavit does
not contain "sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit. " as mandated by Rule 56. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based
on her alleged "review of the Defendant 's account in this matter.., "is improper
testimony in an affidavit and it should have been stricken by the trial court.
All of Gittins' affidavit after paragraph 3 should have been stricken because all of
those subsequent paragraphs are her personal conclusions. Affidavits must be based on
personal knowledge of facts not conclusions.
As previously set forth in this Brief, in paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins
states: "Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant 's
account in this matter. I have determined the following:" (Record, at 31). (Emphasis
added). By making the statement "I hcn?e determined the following." Gittins is
unequivocally stating that everything in her affidavit after paragraph 3 is something that
she has personally determined, not that she knows, not even something that she believes
or that even she may remember, but something that she has determined. Rule 56 does not
permit affidavits to be based on a person's opinion, conclusions or determinations.
Because Gittins unequivocally states that everything in her affidavit after
paragraph 3 is something that she has deteimined, as a matter of law, paragraphs 4
through 14 of her affidavit should have been stricken by the trial court. Statements in an
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affidavit that are inadmissible because they are not based on personal knowledge must be
stricken.
"[Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment," D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989), so an
affidavit which does not meet the requirements of rule 56(e) may be subject to a
motion to strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 65, 498 P.2d 352,
353-54 (1972).
GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157 (Ut. App. 1994).
Because Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule
56, as a matter of law, the trial court was required to strike. Because the trial court failed
and refused to strike Gittins affidavit and then relied on her affidavit when ruling on
Superior's motion for summary judgment, it erred as a matter of law and committed
prejudicial and reversible error when ruling on Superior's motion for summary judgment.
Therefore, as a matter of law, this Court must reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Superior.
POINT V
INTERWEST IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT THE RATE OR 18%.
NOR IS INTEWEST ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY ALLEGED ATTORNEY'S
FEES IN THIS MATTER.
Because Mr. Pett never entered into any signed agreement or contract with
Superior whereby he agreed to pay Superior 18% interest or attorney's fees, the trial court
erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it awarded
Superior interest at 18% interest and attorney's fees when it improperly and unlawfully
granted Superior's motion for summary judgment.
Although Mr. Pett did sign a "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" with Cache
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Valley Speciality Hospital, he never signed any agreement, of any nature whatsoever with
either Intewest or Superior. Mr. Pett did not even know of Interwesf s existence or of
Superior's existence at the time he signed the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment"
with Cache Valley Speciality Hospital. A party cannot enter into an agreement or a
contract with an unknown party. There can not be a meeting of the minds with an
unknown party, and a party cannot be held liable to an assignee if he does not receive
notice of an assignment of an alleged debt.4
The "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" does contain the following language:
1. CONSENT TO TREAT: I consent to the treatment or admission of
at the Cache Valley Speciality Hospital for
services or supplies that have been may be ordered by a licensed professional
healthcare provider. I understand that treatment may include but is not limited to:
radiological examinationsf laboratory procedures, physical therapy, anesthesia,

4.

Notification to a debtor of an assignment of the debt is indispensable if the debtor
is to be held liable to the assignee. If the debt is to be discharged by payment to
someone other than the creditor because of that assignment, unambiguous
notification of the change must be given the debtor;
Timing of the notification of an assignment can be critical to the validity of
assignment because timing can affect the substantive right of the debtor to offset
other credits or defenses the debtor has against the debt. In Time Finance Corp. v.
Johnson Trucking Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d873, 875 (Utah 1969), notice of
an intended assignment was given a debtor's agent prior to the actual execution of
the assignment. However, no notice of the actual assignment was given. The Court
held that notice of the intended assignment was not valid notice and therefore the
assignment itself was not effective. Quoting C.I.T Corp. v. Glennan, 137 Cal.
App. 636, 31 P. 2d 430, 431 (1934), the Court explained that '"an assignee, in
order to protect himself cannot remain silent... [TJo protect his rights, the
assignee must notify the debtor of the assignment, since the latter is entitled to all
setoffs and defenses he may have or may acquire against the assignor, until he is
notified of the assignment.'" Time Fin., 458 P.2d at 876.

Webb v. BrinkerhoffConstr. Co, 972 P.2d 74 (Utah 1988)
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nursing care or medical and surgical treatment I understand that all licensed
professional healthcare providers that render service to the patent are responsible
and liable for their own acts, orders and omissions, I acknowledge that the
hospital has not made no can it make a guarantee of the outcome of treatment.
2. FINANCIAL A GREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies
rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates andfinancial policies in effect
at the time of service. I authorize any overpayment made on this account to be
transferred to any other account balance for which I am responsible. I agree to
pay interest fees on any unpaid balance after 60 days of discharge or date of
service at a rate not to exceed 18% Apr. If this account is assigned to an attorney
or collection agency for collection then I agree to pay all collection fees, court
costs, and attorney's fees.
In his affidavit Mr. Pett testifies that he never received any bills from Interwest for
any services allegedly provided on his behalf and that he never received any notice that
Interwest's claim for its alleged services had been assigned to Superior. (Record, at 55).
The trial court even admitted that there was an issue of fact as to whether or not Mr. Pett
had any knowledge of any amount he allegedly owes Interwest or that Superior had ever
informed him that it had been assigned the alleged debt of Mr. Pett to Interwest. In its
December 28, 2006 memorandum decision states:
The rather oblique arguments that the Defendant never received a collection letter
or a pre-collection letter, or was billed on a regular basis, has nothing to do with
the underlying claim here.
Neither Superior not Interwest provided any copies of any collection letters or
billing statements either of them allegedly sent to Mr. Pett. As a basic matter of fact and
logic, Mr. Pett could not pay an obligation of which he had no knowledge. Therefore,
Mr. Pett cannot be legally required to pay court costs, interest and attorney's fees on an
alleged debt of which he had no knowledge. A notice of an alleged obligation and a
demand for payment must made before an alleged creditor is permitted to file a lawsuit in
-27-

order to extract court costs, interest and attorney fees from an alleged debtor.
Therefore, even assuming that Altius did not pay Interwest for any services
allegedly provided on Mr. Pett's behalf or did not pay the entire amount Interwest claims
it is owed for any services allegedly rendered on behalf of Mr. Pett, neither Interwest nor
Superior were entitled to file suit against Mr. Pett without first notifying Mr. Pett of the
alleged obligation and giving him the opportunity to dispute or pay the alleged obligation.
Neither Interwest nor Superior are entitled to simply file suit against Mr. Pett without first
notifying him of alleged obligation, Webb v. Brinkerhoff Constr. Co, supra. Therefore,
not only is Superior not entitled to court costs, interest and/or attorney's fees, the alleged
assignment to Superior by Interwest is invalid without proper notice to Mr. Pett of the
alleged assignment, Webb v. Brinkerhoff Constr. Co, supra.
Because there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether or not either Interwest or
Superior ever notified Mr. Pett that he allegedly owed Interwest for any services allegedly
provided on his behalf, the trial court erred as a matter of law, in awarding Superior court
costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees, when it improperly and unlawfully granted
Superior's motion for summary judgment. Therefore, as a matter of law, this Court must
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior and reverse the
trial court's award of court costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees to Superior, as
specified in the trial court' improper and unlawful grant of summary judgment in favor of
Superior.
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible
error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment. The trial court erred, as
a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it weighed disputed
facts in this case. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and
reversible error when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the light most favorable
to Superior. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and
reversible error when it failed to strike the affidavit of Gittins. The trial court erred, as a
matter of law, and committed prejudicial and reversible error when it awarded court
costs, interest at 18% and attorney's fees to Superior.
Because the trial court erred, as a matter of law, and committed prejudicial and
reversible error when it granted Superior's motion for summary judgment, when it
weighed disputed facts in this case, when it viewed the disputed facts in this case in the
light most favorable to Superior, and when it awarded court costs, interest at 18% and
attorney's fees to Superior, this Court must, as a matter of law, reverse the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Superior. Therefore, Mr. Pett respectfully
requests that this Court issue an order reversing the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Superior and remand this matter back to the district court for further
proceedings.

//A
Respectfully submitted this / /

day of November 2007.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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correct copes of the foregoing Brief to the person(s) at the address(es) below, by
depositing a copy(s) in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Jonathan P. Thomas
31 Federal Ave.
Logan, UT 84321

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES vs. JAMES PETT
CASE NUMBER 060100241 Debt Collection

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
GORDON J LOW
PARTIES
Plaintiff - SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES
P.O. BOX 285
LOGAN, UT 84323
Represented by: JONATHAN P THOMAS
Defendant - JAMES PETT
640 S 200 W
BRIGHAM CITY, UT 84302
SSN: xxx-xx-5081
Represented by: CHARLES A SCHULTZ
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due
Amount Paid
Credit
Balance

255.00
255.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL

TYPE: COMPLAINT 0K-2K
Amount Due :
50.00
Amount Paid :
50.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: API3EAL
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance.

205.00
205.00
0.00
0.00

!ASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
)2-01-06 Filed: Complaint With Exhibit A 0-2K
^2-01-06 Filed: Cover Sheet For Civil Filing Actions

printed: 01/29/07 15:56:19
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louisen
katieb

CASE NUMBER 060100241 Debt Collection
02-01-06 Filed return: Return of Service on Summons
Party Served: PETT, JAMES
Service Type Personal
Service Date January 30, 20 06
02-01-06 Case filed
02-06-06 Judge LOW assigned.
02-07-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
50.00
02-07-06 COMPLAINT 0K-2K
Payment Received:
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 0K-2K
02-17-06 Filed: Answer
JAMES PETT

katieb

50.00

louisen
louisen
louisen
louisen
angeladb

03-07-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 060100241 ID 8787578
jillfb
We are unable to enter the default judgment/certificate in this
case for the following reasons:
An Answer has been filed by the defendant.

Dated this

day of

20

District Court Clerk
07-21-06 Notice - Notice of Intent for Case 060100241
tonyas
Clerk:
TONYA SHIELDS
Notice is hereby given that, due to inactivity, the above enti tied
matter may be dismissed for lack of prosecution. Unless a writ ten
statement is received by the court within 2 0 days of this notice
showing good cause why this should not be dismissed, the court will
dismiss without further notice.
07-31-06 Filed: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment
tonyas
07-31-06 Filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities
tonyas
tonyas
07-31-06 Filed Affidavit of Wendy Gittins
08-17-06 Filed Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary
Judgment
tonyas
08-21-06 Filed Submission of Defendant's Exhibit No. 1
tonyas
08-28-06 Filed Reply Memorandum
tonyas
tonyas
08-30-06 Filed Request to Submit for Decision
09-01-06 Filed order: Memorandum Decision
tonyas
Judge jlow
Signed September 01, 2006

Printed: 01/29/07 15:56:20
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CASE NUMBER 060100241 Debt Collection
06 Filed: Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins
tonyas
06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike the Affidavit
of Wendy Gittins
tonyas
0 9 - 1 3 06 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition (Motion to Strike the Affidavi t
of Wendy Gittins)
tonyas
1 2 - 1 2 0 6 Filed: Memorandum Of Costs And Disbursements (Through Judgment)tonil
1 2 - 1 2 06 Filed: Affidavit Of Attorney's Fees
tonil
1 2 - 2 0 0 6 Filed order: Findings Order and Judgment
tonyas
Judge jlow
Signed December 20, 2006
tonyas
12-20 0 6 Judgment #1 Entered
Note: Interest is 18%
Creditor: SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES
Debtor:
JAMES PETT
2,400.59 Total Judgment
2,400.59 Judgment Grand Total
12-20-06 Case Disposition is Judgment
tonyas
Disposition Judge is GORDON J LOW
tonyas
12-20-06 Filed: Objection to Findings of Facts
tonyas
12-28-06 Filed order: Memorandum Decision
tonyas
Judge jlow
Signed December 28, 2 006
tonyas
12-29 •06 Filed: Notice of Entry and Certificate of Service
tonyas
12-29- •06 Filed: Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements
tonyas
12-29- •06 Issued: Abstract of Judgment
Clerk tonyas
tonyas
01- 02-07 Filed: Judgment Information Statement
tonyas
01- 09-07 Filed order: Order
Judge jlow
Signed January 09, 2 0 07
01-29-07 Filed: Notice of Appeal
louisen
louisen
Jl-29-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
205.00
louisen
U-29-07 APPEAL
Payment Received:
2 05.00
Note: Code Description: APPEAL
09-05
09-05
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Jonathan P. Thomas (8513)
JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 792-4505
FileNo.:C05-436
Superior No.: 18951

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

JAMES PETT
Defendant.

Judge: Clint S. Judkins
Gordon J. Low
Thomas L. Willmore

The Plaintiff, Superior Recovery Services, Inc., ("Superior"), hereby complains of James
Pert (the "Defendant") and for cause of action alleges the following:
PARTIES
1.

Superior is a Utah corporation duly licensed as a collection agency.

2.

The Defendant is an individual residing in County, State of Utah.
JURISDICTION & VENUE

3.

Venue is proper in this court because this action involves services and supplies

that were provided in Cache County, State of Utah, and a contract that was executed in Cache
County, State of Utah.

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

The Defendant, or a member of the Defendant's family, obtained services and

supplies from the Plaintiffs assignor, Interwest Anesthesia, in Cache County, Utah.
5.

At that time, the Defendant promised to pay for these services and supplies, and

signed an agreement (the "Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by
reference as Exhibit "A."
6.

The Defendant breached the Agreement by not paying for the services and

supplies.
7.

The services and supplies obtained by the Defendant, or the Defendant's family,

constitute a family expense and are the legal responsibility of the Defendant as provided by §302-9, Utah Code.
8.

The Defendant has failed to pay the debt, despite repeated demands to do so.

9.

The Agreement, which provides that the Defendant is liable for court costs, the

costs of collection, contract interest, and the attorney's fees incurred in the collection process.
10.

The Defendant's unpaid account was duly and regularly assigned to Superior,

which included a collection fee.
11.

The Agreement provides for interest at the rate of 18%, per annum, and Superior

is entitled to interest at the contract rate both before and after judgment.
12.

In the event the Defendant fails to timely defend against this action and a default

judgment is entered, Superior, pursuant to Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, elects
such attorney's fees in the amount consistent with this Rule.
13.

However, Superior reserves the right to submit an affidavit for actual attorney's

fees and to motion the Court for reasonable augmented costs and attorney's fees.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
14.

Superior hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1-13 by reference.

15.

As of the filing of this action, the Defendant owes Superior:
$627.04
$29.44
$317.57
$75.00
$250.00
$0.00
$1,299.05

Unpaid Principal
Accrued Interest at 18.00%
(Through January 10,2006)
Collection Fee
Accrued costs to date (Filing fee: $f
Estimated Service Fe
Attorney's fees to date
Less Payments Made
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Superior demands judgment against the Defendants as follows:
1.

Superior be granted relief in accordance with the aforesaid allegations.

2.

For judgment against Defendant in the amount of $1,299.05, and all additional

sums, including accruing interest at the Agreement rate, court costs, and costs of collection, and
attorney's fees accrued subsequent to the filing of this action.
3.

For such further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED January 10,2006.
JONAT^AN^r^HOMAS, P.C.

Defendant:
James Pett
640 South 200 West v ~
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Fi!e#C05-436,jpb

Charles A. Schultz (4760)
Attorney for James E. Pett
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Phone: 435.225.2636

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT

SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, INC.,
ANSWER
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES E. PETT,
Defendant.

Case No.
Judge:

COMES NOW, James Pett and answers the plaintiffs complaint as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

7. Mr. Pett denies that the plaintiffs assignor ever provided any services to him. Mr. Pett
is without knowledge as to whether or not the plaintiffs assignor ever provided seivices on behalf
of the defendant's family members and therefore denies the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of
the plaintiffs complaint. Additionally, Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never entered into
any agreement with the plaintiffs assignor.
8. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs complaint.
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never received any bills, letters or requests for payment from
the plaintiffs assignor.
9. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the plaintiffs complaint.
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never entered into any agreement or contract with the
plaintiffs assignor.
10. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of the plaintiffs complaint.
11. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the plaintiffs complaint.
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that he never entered into any agreement or contract with the
plaintiffs assignor.
12. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of the plaintiffs complaint.
13. Mr. Pett denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of the plaintiffs complaint.
14. In response to paragraph 14 of the plaintiffs complaint, Mr. Pett reasserts his
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SIXTH DEFENSE
(BREACH OF CONTRACT)
Mr. Pett affirmatively asserts that the plaintifTs assignor breached any contract with him
by failing and refusing to bill his insurance company for any services allegedly provided to his
family, as was agreed when Mr. Pett agreed to permit Cache Valley Speciality Hospital to provide
services to a member of his family.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
(UNCLEAN HANDS)
Ms. Pett affirmatively asserts that the plaintiff and/or the plaintiffs assignor are bared by
the Doctrine of Unclean Hands from complaining against him, for the reason that the plaintiff
and/or the plaintiffs assignor have failed and refused to do justice to Mr. Pett and may not now
ask for justice for themselves.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
(BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING)
Utah law imposes an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts. The plaintiff
and/or the plaintiffs assignor breached its obligation of good faith and fair dealing by failing to
bill Mr. Pett's insurance company for any services allegedly provided to Mr. Pett's family and by
failing to inform Mr. Pett that the plaintiff and/or the plaintiffs assignor allegedly rendered any
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failure of limitations, fraud, illegality, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, and waiver. Mr. Pett specifically preserves these, and all other,
affirmative defenses as they are ascertained through further discovery.
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the plaintiffs complaint, Mr. Pett prays that the
plaintiffs complaint be dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits; that Mr. Pett, pursuant to
the provisions of U.C.A. Section 78-27-56 and Rule 11 URCP, be awarded his attorney's fees and
court costs incurred by himin defending this bad faith, meritless action, filed by the plaintiff
and/or its assignor, and for such further and additional relief as the Court deems just and proper.
Dated this

day of February 2006.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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Jonathan P. Thomas (8513)
JONATHAN P. THOMAS. P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 792-4505
File No.: C05-436
Superior No.: 18951

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES

vs.
CaseNo.060100241DC
JAMES PETT,
Defendants.

Judge: Gordon J. Low

Pursuant to Rules 7, 12 & 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, Superior
Recovery Services, Inc., ("Plaintiff'), by and through its' attorney, Jonathan P. Thomas,
respectfully submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in the alternative for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about May 27, 2004, Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the Defendant's

daughter, in Cache County, State of Utah, obtained services and supplies from Interwest
Anesthesia, and the principal charge was $572.00. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins
2.

The Defendant promised to pay for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the

"Agreement'"). Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.

3.

The Agreement provides that among the services that may be provided are anesthesia.

Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
4.

The Agreement provides that Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and

supplies, he is liable for interest at 18% per annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which
includes a collection fee, and the attorney's fees incurred in the collection process. Please see
the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
5.

The Agreement states under paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to

pay for all services and supplies rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and financial
policies in effect at the time of service." Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
6.

Paragraph 3 states: "I understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not

covered by my insurance policy(s)." Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
7.

Per the terms of the Agreement, and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is

made whole, a collection charge was added to the account in the amount of $317.57 prior to
referral to Superior. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
8.

The Defendant breached the Agreement by not paying for the services and supplies.

Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
9.

On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a

payment, in the amount of $334.62, to Interwest Anesthesia. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy
Gittins.
10.

However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about

February 25, 2005, Altius paid the Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies
provide by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. Please
see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.

11.

Interwest Anesthesia sent statements to the Defendant on a regular basis. On the

account statement, when there is a finance charge, those are the dates that we sent statements.
Finally, on September 1, 2005, Interwest Anesthesia sent a pre-collection letter to the Defendant,
which included a copy of the account statement to day, requesting payment. The Defendant did
not pay. Please see the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
ARGUMENT
The Defendant's daughter received services and supplies from Interwest Anesthesia, and
neither the Defendant nor the Defendant's insurance have paid for these services and supplies.
The Defendant is responsible for this account for two reasons. First, he signed the
Agreement to be responsible. The Agreement clearly states: "I agree to pay for all services and
supplies rendered to the patient . . . "
The second is based upon the following code section.
§78-45-3 U.C.A. provides:
Duty of man.
(1) Every father shall support his child and every child shall be presumed to be
in need of the support of his father. Every man shall support his wife when she is
in need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-457.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable upon
the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described
in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
The languages of the above code section is clear. Simply, parents are responsible for
their children.
Additionally, in the case of Ottley v. Hill, 446 P.2d 301 (Utah 1968), Mr. Ottley's son,
who was 4 years of age at the time, was killed when he was struck by an automobile operated by

defendant Hill. The plaintiff had maintained a medical insurance policy which included
coverage for his son. At trial the trial court found that the plaintiff incurred $1,180.80 in
medical expenses and $525.76 in funeral expenses, for a total of $1,706.56 for his son. The
plaintiff had maintained two insurance policies covering his son, one auto, which paid the
plaintiff $500.00, and one medical, which paid the plaintiff $1,009.30, for a total of $1,509.30.
The trial court ruled that under the terms of the insurance policy, the plaintiffs son was a
beneficiary, which meant that the benefits were part of his estate. The trial court then deducted
the medical expenses and funeral expenses ($1,706.56) from what was paid under the insurance
policies ($1,509.30), and awarded the plaintiff special damages representing the difference
($197.26). id at 397-398.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in deducting from the
special damages the amount received by the plaintiff from the insurance carriers, stating that:
It was the duty of the plaintiff to support his son [citing Burbidge v. Utah Light &
Traction, Co., 196 P. 556], if he is able to do so, and that duty is imposed by
statute in this State [citing §30-2-9 U.C.A.; §78-45-3 U.C.A.; and §78-45-4
U.C.A.]. The duty of support includes the duty of furnishing medical care and
treatment. The plaintiff being under a legal duty to pay and discharge the costs of
medical care and treatment and for the burial of his son, he is entitled to recover
from the defendant those amounts reasonably expended for that purpose. Had
there been no insurance the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover his outof-pocket expenditures for medial care and for burial of his child without
questions. The fact that the plaintiff at his own expense carried insurance to
protect against such contingencies should not inure to the benefit of the
wrongdoer [citing Phillips v. Bennett, 439 P.2d 457]..

Additionally, in the case of in the case of Berow v. Shields, 159 P. 538, 539 (Utah 1916),
the Utah Supreme Court stated that in regard to a claim for recovery based upon "family
expenses" and whether or not they are "necessaries", the Court stated: fc\ . . all that is required by
the statue is that the things purchased are legitimate or proper family expenses.

Therefore, the Defendant is responsible for the unpaid portions because, pursuant to §7845-3 U.C.A., he is responsible for the medial services and supplies to his son.
Additionally, the Agreement provides: "I agree to pay interest fees on any unpaid balance
. . . at a rate not to exceed 18% apr."
Moreover, the Agreement provides: "If this account is assigned to an attorney or a
collection agency for collection then I agree to pay all collection agency fees, court costs, and
attorney's fees."
CONCLUSION
In sum, judgment should enter in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant
consistent with the terms of the Agreement, the Plaintiffs Complaint, and as set forth in this
Memorandum and the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins.
DATED this Jj>day of July, 2006.

JONAT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, first class and postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, to:
Charles A. Schultz
Attorney at Law
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
DATED this V_ day of July, 2006.

Charles A. Schultz (4760)
Attorney for James E. Pett
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Phone: 435.225.2636

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT

SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, INC.,

MEMORAND UM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

vs.

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

JAMES E. PETT,

Case No. 060100241 DC

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Judge: Gordon J. Low

COMES NOW, James Pett and submits the following Memorandum in opposition to the
Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative for summary judgment
(hereinafter, "the plaintiffs motion.").

Although Superior styled its motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, it is in fact
a motion for summary judgment, because it is based on the affidavit of Gittins. When matters
outside of the pleadings are submitted in conjunction with a motion to dismiss, "Rule 12 requires
that the motion be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56
Utah R Civ. P. 12(b), (c), " DOIT. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.. 926 P.2d 835, 838 n. 3 (Utah
1996).
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
If on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
According to this rule, even though defendant's motion was initially for dismissal because
of plaintiffs' failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b),
once the ancillary complaint which was outside the pleadings was presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion was properly treated as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56. Even where a motion is erroneously characterized as a motion to dismiss, if
matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded, the motion is properly
treated as one for summary judgment.
Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191 (1977). see also Bekins Bar V
Ranch v. Utah Farm Production Credit Ass'n.. 587 P,2d 151 (Utah 1978); Hughes v. Housely.
Utah. 599 P.2d 1250 (1979); Harvey v. Sanders. Utah, 534 P.2d 905 (1975); Lind v. Lynch 665
P.2d 1276 (Utah, 1983). Therefore, superior's motion for judgment on the pleadins must be
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reviewed and examined under the standard for a summary judgment motion rather than a motion
for judgment under Rule 12(c).

STATEMENT OF DISPUTE FACTS
1. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs statement of
facts, set forth in plaintiffs "Memorandum of Points and Authorities, " (hereinafter,

"plaintiffs

memorandum. " Paragraph 1 of the plaintiffs statement of facts is based on the affidavit of a
Wendy Gittins and her affidavit is based on her review and personal interpretation of alleged
entries in alleged documents allegedly prepared by the plaintiff However, Gittins does not claim
that she was present when Ms. Pett was allegedly given any treatment or that she prepared any of
the documents on which she relies in making her assertions, set forth in her affidavit. Therefore,
her personal interpretation of the meaning of the contents of any alleged documents allegedly
prepared by the plaintiff does not establish any fact, even assuming the documents on which she
allegedly relied are in fact true and accurate that may be admissible under hearsay exceptions.
The alleged documents speak for themselves and any possible hearsay exception to their
admissibility does not make their alleged contents undisputed facts.1
2. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 2 of the plaintiffs statement of
facts. Mr. Pett never signed any contract or agreement with the plaintiff. £££ the affidavit of

1. Exhibit A to Gittins' affidavit, termed a "Patient Ledger Analysis, " appears to be a
document created expressly for purposes of this litigation, rather than a document that is prepared
and kept in the ordinary course of business.
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James Pett, a copy of which is attached to this Memorandum as Exhibit 1. Furthermore, the
document attached to Gittins affidavit as Exhibit B is not an agreement between Mr. Pett and the
plaintiff, as the plaintiff falsely claims. It is an agreement between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley
Speciality Hospital.
3. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 3 of the plaintiffs statement of
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 3 is simply
Gittins'' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact.
4. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 4 of the plaintiffs statement of
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 4 is simply
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact.
5. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs statement of
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. S>££ Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 5 is simply
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact.
6. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 6 of the plaintiffs statement of
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 6 is simply
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact.
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7. Mr. Pett admits that the plaintiff added a collection charge in the amount of $327.57,
set forth in paragraph 7 of the plaintiffs statement of facts. However, Mr. Pett asserts that the
plaintiff had no legal right to do so. See Exhibit 1. Furthermore paragraph 7 is again Gittins5
personal interpretation, opinion, and conclusion. It is not as statement of fact.
8. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs statement of
facts to the extent that those assertions imply that Mr. Pett ever entered into any contract for
agreement with the plaintiff for any services. &e£ Exhibit 1. Furthermore pai'agraph 6 is simply
Gittins' personal interpretation, opinion, and legal conclusion. It is not as statement of fact.
9. Mr. Pett is without knowledge as to whether or not his insurance carrier paid the
plaintiff the sum of $334.62 to the plaintiff on July 12, 2004; however, Gittins claim that it did
does not make her claim a fact.
10. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 10 of the plaintiff's statement of
facts. Mr. Pett never received any payment from his insurance carrier. His insurance carrier does
not make direct payments to its insured. See Exhibit 1. Additionally Mr. Pett disputes the
plaintiffs assertion that his insurance carrier retracted the alleged July 12, 2004 payment to the
plaintiff on July 31, 2005, some 384 days after it made the alleged payment to the plaintiff.
11. Mr. Pett disputes the assertions set forth in paragraph 11 of the plaintiff's statement of
facts. Mr. Pett has never received any letters from the plaintiff or its assignor Interwest
Anaesthesia. The first Mr. Pett knew that Interwest was claiming he had an outstanding bill is
when he was served with a summons and complaint in this matter. £fi£ Exhibit 1.
-v-

ARGUMENT
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRESENT IN THIS CASE
WHICH PRECLUDE THIS COURT FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT
IT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE
DENIED.
POINT I
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFF WAS
PAH) FOR ANY MEDICAL SERVICES ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED TO MR. PETT'S
DAUGHTER. THEREFORE, THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER.
On page 2, % 9, of the plaintiffs statement of facts, set forth in its memorandum of points
and authorities (hereinafter, "plaintiffs memorandum"), the plaintiff claims that it was paid the
sum of $334.62 by Mr. Pett's insurance carrier on July 12, 2004. Then on page 2, ^f 10, page 2 of
the plaintiffs statement of facts, set forth in its memorandum the plaintiff claims that Mr. Pett's
insurance carrier "However, Altms retracted that payment on July 31, 2005.... "
It is not reasonable or logical to assume that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier could or would
retract a payment it made to Interwest 384 days earlier, and the plaintiff offers no explanation as
to how Mr. Pett's insurance carrier was able to retract a payment it made more than a year earlier.
Checks are required to clear a bank within 48 hours. Did Interwest not deposit Mr. Pett's
insurance carrier's payment for more than a year? Does Mr. Pett's insurance carrier have direct
access to Inerwest's back account, permitting it make deposits and withdrawals as it sees fit? If
not, how could it retract a payment it made 384 days earlier without Inerwest's consent and
authority?
-1-

There is no evidence that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier ever withdrew the payment the
plaintiff admits it made to Interwest Gittins' self-serving allegations, set forth in her affidavit, do
not establish that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest, and,
likewise, the alleged "Patient Ledger Analysis " does not establish as a matter of fact that Mr.
Pett's insurance carrier ever "retracted" any payment to Interwest. If the plaintiff is going to
claim that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier "retracted" any payment to Interwest, it must provide proof
in the form of bank statements showing that the payment, it admits Interwest received from Mr.
Pett's insurance carrier, was ever "retracted, as the plaintiff claims.2
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Interwest was paid by
Mr. Pett's insurance carrier, as a matter of law, this Court cannot grant the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment. Therefore, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment must be denied.
POINT II
MR. PETT NEVER SIGNED ANY CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT WITH INTERWEST
FOR ANY TYPE OF SERVICES.
Contrary to the plaintiff's assertions, Mr. Pett never signed any contract with Interwest
whereby he agreed to pay Interwest for any goods, services, materials, supplies or other items
allegedly provided to him or on his behalf. And Interwest never billed Mr. Pett for any goods,

2. Likewise, if the plaintiff is going to claim that Mr. Pett received $514.80 from his insurance
carrier on February 25, 2005, it must provide proof of the alleged payment, i.e., a canceled check
with Mr. Pett's signature on it depositing it in his bank account or cashing it
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services, materials, supplier or other items allegedly provided to him or on his behalf. See
Exhibit 1.
Although the plaintiff claims that Intewest sent Mr. Pett "statements on a regular basis, " it
has not included any copies of those alleged "statements " in the documents it has provided to Mr.
Pett or filed with the Court. Likewise, the plaintiff has failed to provide either the Court or Mr.
Pett with the "pre-collection letter" it claims it allegedly sent to Mr. Pett on September 1, 2005.
If Interwest truly sent Mr. Pett (istatements on a regular basis " and/or a "pre-collection letter" it
was required to attach copies of those alleged documents to its "memorandum" when it filed its
"motion." The plaintiff cannot simply rely on Gittins' interpretation of the "Patient Ledger
Analysis " as a factual basis that Interwest ever sent Mr. Pett "statements on a regular basis "
and/or a "pre-collection letter. "3
Mr. Pett cannot be required to pay a debt of which he has no knowledge. $££ Exhibit 1.
POINT III
MR. PETT CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY A DEBT OF WHICH HE HAS NO
KNOWLEDGE AND WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN, AND MAY HAVE BEEN, PAID
BY HIS INSURANCE CARRIER.
The plaintiff is correct in its claim that a man is required to support his children, and that a
man may be required to pay for the medical expenses incurred on behalf of his minor children.
However, Mr. Pett is not required to pay a claim for medical expenses of which he has no
knowledge and which may have been paid by his insurance company.
3. Plaintiffs memorandum, page 2, ^ 11.
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Contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, Mr. Pett is not "responsible for the unpaid portions
because, pursuant to §78-45-3 U.C.A., he is responsible for the medical services and supplies to
his son. "4 Mr. Pett has no son. &e£ Exhibit 1. And although Mr. Pett may be required to pay for
medical care of his daughter, the plaintiff is not entitled to collect from Mr. Pett without Interwest
first informing Mr. Pett of any such obligation and without giving Mr. Pett the opportunity to pay
any alleged obligation after it is made known to him.
In the instant matter, there is no evidence that Mr. Pett was ever informed of any claim by
Interwest of any alleged outstanding bill or given the opportunity to pay any alleged bill. There
is, however, an admission by Inerwest that Mr. Petf s insurance carrier paid Interwest.5 Mr. Pett
cannot pay a debt of which he has no knowledge. See Exhibit 1.
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Mr. Pett was ever
informed of any alleged obligation to pay Interwest for any alleged services and because there is a
genuine issue as to whether Interwest was in fact paid for any alleged services provided to or on
behalf of Mr. Pett, this Court cannot grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, based on
the provisions in the Utah Code that require a man to provide for his minor children and to pay
their medical expenses.

4. Plaintiffs memorandum, page 5, % 1.
5. Plaintiffs memorandum, page 2, % 9.
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POINT V
INTERWEST IS NOT ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT THE RATE OR 18%. NOR IS
INTEWEST ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY ALLEGED ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS
MATTER.
Mr. Pett never entered into any signed agreement or contract with Interwest whereby he
agreed to pay Intewest 18% interest, as the plaintiff falsely claims. Likewise^ Mr. Pett never into
any signed agreement or contract with Interwest whereby he agreedlxrpay Interwest's attorney's
fees should his insurance carrier fail to pay for any treatment covered under his health care policy
The "Agreement" to which the plaintiff refers is not between Interwest and Mr. Pett. It is
between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley Speciality Hospital. Mr. Pett could not have entered into an
agreement with Inerwest at the time he signed the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" which
is an agreement between Mr. Pett and Cache Valley Speciality Hospital. Mr. Pett did not even
know of Interwest's existence. A party cannot enter into an agreement or a contract with an
unknown party.
Because Mr. Pett never entered into any contract or agreement with Interwest that provides
for interest at 18% or for recovery of attorney's fees, the plaintiff is not entitled, under any
circumstances to collect interest at the rate of 18% or to recover any attorney's fees from Mr. Pett.
Therefore^ the plaintiffs assertion that it is entitled to recover interest at the rate of 18% or to
recover any attorney's fees from Mr. Pett must be summarily denied.6
6. Even assuming, arguendo, that the terms of the "Consent and Conditions of
Treatment" enured to the benefit of Interwest, those terms do not enure to the benefit of
the plaintiff. If Interwest had sued Mr. Pett in its own name, as plaintiff it could perhaps
claim that the terms of the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" enured to the benefit
-5-

CONCLUSION
Because there are genuine issues of material fact present in this case, and because the
plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs motion for
summary must be summarily denied.

/s

Dated this ' J

T1

day of August 2006.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett

of Interwest. However, when the plaintiff chose to file the instant action in its own name
any arguable obligations Mr. Pett had under the the "Consent and Conditions of
Treatment" did not transfer to the benefit of the plaintiff.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /

}

day of August, I mailed a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing Memorandum to the person(s) at the address(es) listed below by depositing a copy in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid.
Jonathan P. Thomas
31 Federal Ave.
Logan, UT 84321

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett
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and would so testily if called to do so at trial of this matter.
2. I have read the affidavit of Wendy Gittins, and many of the tilings she states in
her affidavit are false.
3. I never signed any agreement with Inteiwesi Anesthesia Agreement for service
of any type,
4. I never promised to pay Interwest any amount for anytxiing, as Gittins states in
•ncxmcrrcirilri ^ n-fh&r
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^-ffirlaxrit

V J L -a.*.w.a. <^.,A,A.JL^*-W» » x v .

5. I never even knewtiiatInterwest provided any services to any member of my
family.
6. I never knew that Interwest existed until this lawsuit.
7. The "Consent and Conditions of Treatment attached to Gittins' affidavit is not
an agreement to pay Interwest; as Gittins falsely claims. It is an agreement for consent
for treatment and conditions of treatment with Cash Valley Speciality Hospital Interwest
is not even mentioned in the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment."

8. Gittins' statements contained in paragraphs 6 through are not true. They deal
with the "Consent and Conditions of Treatment" with Cash Valley Speciality Hospital,
not Interwest.
9. Gittins' claim, as set forth in paragraph 13 of her affidavit, that on February
25, 2005, Altius paid me $514,80, is not true. I have never received any payment from
Altius in the fifteen years I have been covered by their insurance.
10. I have never received any bills from Interwest, as claimed by Gittins in
paragraph 14 of her affidavit, and I do not believe any were ever sent.
11. I never received a "pre-collectwn letter, " as claimed by Gittins in paragraph
14 of her affidavit, and I do not believe any were ever sent.
12. I did not know that Interwest was claiining that I owed them any amount of
money or that they were claiming that Altius failed to pay them for any services allegedly
provided to my daughter, Heather, until I was served with a summons and complaint from
Superior.
13. I have no way of knowing if Altius paid Interwest $334.62 on July 12, 2004,
as Gittins claims in paragraph 12 of her affidavit, however, I never received $514.80 from
Altius on February 25, 2005. I would remember if, out of the blue, anyone sent me a
check for $514.80, and if Interwest claims Altius did, where is a copy of the check with
my signature on it?
14. Contrary to Superior's false claim, I do not have a son, and I have never had a
son.

15. I have never signed any contracts or agreements with Superior for anything
and I would never do so.
16. I never knew that Superior existed until I was served with a summons and
complaint in this lawsuit.

Dated this / 7

day of August 2006

Jamejr^. Pert

Sworn and subscribed to this

^ ^ V V A ^

Notary Public

JIM A

NOTARY PUBLIC
RICHARD PRINCE
1344 V¥Mt 4075 South
OOEkKI. Utah 84409
My Commtuton ExpireM*cft 10,2008
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day of August 2006

In the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of Utah
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES,
INC.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
Case Number: 060100241 DC

vs.
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW
JAMES PETT,
Defendant.

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon a motion filed by the Plaintiff on July
31,2006 styled Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment, but it is more appropriately considered to be a Motion for Summary Judgment.
For the reasons set forth in the Plaintiffs Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities and its
Reply Memorandum, the motion is granted. The Court would suggest that the defenses raised in
the Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disingenuous. The Plaintiff is granted judgment as
plead, including interest, costs, and attorney's fees.
The Court solicits from counsel for the Plaintiff a formal order in conformance herewith,
together with an Affidavit in support of its claim for attorney's fees.
Dated this If day of September. 2006.
BY THE COURT
,lC'!'

/

""'

v

, •

. J. £bw, District Court Judge
irst District Court

7
2006-08-31/GJL/ts
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Charles A. Schultz (4760)
Attorney for James £ Pert
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Phone 435.225.2636

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT

SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, INC.,

OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES E. PETT,
Defendant.

Case No. 060100241 DC
Judge, low

COMES NOW, James Pert and objects to the plaintiffs proposed findings of fact on the
following grounds:
1. Although die court ordered the plaintiff to prepare findings of facts, the plamtiff m fact
prepared no findings of fact. Mr. Pert admits that it would be extremely difficult for the plaintiff
to prepare any findings of fact, because the court never specified any facts in its memorandum

decision granting thQ plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. If the court wants the plaintiff to
prepare findings of fact, the conn should, at the minimum, give some indication of the "facts"
upon which it based its memorandum decision, even though preparation of factual findings on a
summary judgment motion is inappropriate. Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. provides;
In all actions tried upon thefacis without a jury. . ., the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon
With certain exceptions, not applicable here, the just-quoted rule must he complied with
and a judgment cannot stand unless there are findings which will justify it The failure of
the trial court to enter adequate findings requires that the judgment be vacated.
Anderson v. Utah Cty. Bd. Of Cty. CommVs.. 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1984)
2. It is inappropriate for the court to direct the plaintiff io prepare findings of fact on a
summary judgment. On summary judgment, it is inappropriate to make findings of fact or to even
decide facts. On summary judgment a court can only determine that there are no disputed facts. It
cannot weigh and deteraiine disputed fact, as the court did in this case.
}1

Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Jones v. ERA Brokers Console
2000 UT 61, 1 8, 6 P. 3d 1129; see also Utah It Civ. R 56(c).
Collard v. Nagle Construction. Inc.. 57 P.3d 603 (UT App. 2002).
Hearing was had on these pleadings, and the tnal court granted summary judgment in
favor of'Buzas Baseball but also entered findings of fact, which are clearly inappropriate in
any gnmt of summary'judgment. By definition, summary judgment cannot be granted where
there are disputed facts. Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P 2d 650, 65'-J (Utah 199-IJ
("Summary Judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact remain.... ").

Buzas Baseball Inc v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996).
3, The plaintiffs proposed finding stating: "The Court finds that the defenses raised in the
Defendants 7s Memorandum in Opposition appear to be disiingemiovs, " is not a finding of fact. At
best it is an improper comment based in the court's impermissible weighing of disputed facts.
A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment motion, but is
only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) (On a motion for summary judgment, a trial
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material
issues of fact exist."), viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom
in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tretheway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc.,
2000 UT12, V 995 P.2d 599.
Pigs Gun Club. Inc. v. Sanpete Cty.. 42 P.3d 379 ( Utah 2001),
For the forgoing reasons the plaintiffs proposed findings, order and judgment should be
rejected. Furthermore, for the forgoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant should be vacated, as it will be on appeal.

Dated this / / ' day of December 2006.

Charles A Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pert
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Jonathan P. Thomas (8513)
JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 792-4505
Fax: (435)752-3556
Superior No.: 18951

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,
FINDINGS, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.: 060100241 DC
JAMES PETT
Judge: Gordon J. Low
Defendant.
THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings or in he alternative for Summary Judgment, which was supported by the Memorandum
of Points and Authorities. The Defendant has not replied. The Plaintiff subsequently submitted
an Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, and a Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. The Court,
having reviewed the Motion, Memorandums, and Exhibits, and being otherwise fully advised in
the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
FINDINGS
The Court finds that the defenses raised in the Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition
appear to be disingenuous.

ORDER
The Plaintiffs Motion is hereby granted.
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff be awarded Judgment against the
Defendants as follows:

$627.04

Unpaid Principal

$131.48

Accrued Interest at 18.00%
(Through December 6, 2006)

$317.57

Collection Costs

$94.50

L ,230.00
$0.00
'400.59

Accrued expenses to date (Filing fee: $50.00
Service Fees: $19.50
Miscellaneous/Copy Fee: $25.00)
Attorney's fees to date
Less Payments Made
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE

Interest is to accrue on the total judgment at the current judgment interest rate of 18.00%
from the date of this Judgment, until paid, plus after-accruing costs.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Judgment shall be augmented in the amount of
reasonable costs and attorney fees expended in collecting said Judgment by execution or
otherwise as shall be established by Affidavit.
DATED this ZJb day of December, 2006.
BY THE COT

District Court Judge
Entered

%
%
"•N,^

In the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of Utah
SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES,
INC.,
Plaintiffs), j

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Number: 060100241 DC

vs.

I
JUDGE: GORDON J, LOW

JAMES E. PETT,

|
Defendant(s). j

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Strike the
Affidavit of Wendy Gittins. Procedurally, the Court notes that the initial Complaint was filed on
the 1st of February, 2006. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed on the 31st of July a Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. Defendant filed a response to that
motion on the 17th of August, to which Plaintiff then replied on 28th of August. This Court then
issued & Memorandum Decision on the 1st of September, 2006, granting the motion for summary
judgment. Defendant then belatedly filed his Motion to Strike on the 5th of September, seeking to
strike the affidavit supporting Plaintiffs summary judgment motion. In response to this new
motion, Plaintiff submitted a response on the 13th of September. No further pleadings with
respect to the motion to strike were submitted. A set of Findings, Order and Judgment was filed
with the Court by the Plaintiff and subsequently entered by the Court on the 20th of December,
2006. An objection thereto was filed by the Defendant later that day.
Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit is late and inappropriate. Leave could have
been requested by Defendant if he sought to set aside the Court's memorandum decision or to
otherwise attack the judgment. Defendant is correct, however, in arguing that Plaintiff should not
have submitted to the Court a set of Findings of Fact. Findings of Fact are not to be provided or
-1-

entered by the Court upon motion for summary judgment, as the Court does not weigh the facts
when making summary judgment determinations. It should be noted that the Court did not
request a set of Findings, but in fact solicited from Plaintiffs counsel a formal order in
conformance with the memorandum decision granting the motion for summary judgment.
Concerns raised by Defendant in his Motion to Strike and Opposition to Summary Judgment
Contrary to the suggestion by the Defendant that the Court made the Findings of Fact, the
Court observed that the defenses raised in Defendant's memorandum appeared to be
disingenuous. By way of explanation, in a review of the Defendant's response to the motion for
summary judgment the Court addressed procedural propriety of that motion. The Court agreed
that the matter was not for judgment on the pleadings but more properly for a Rule 56 decision.
In this light, the submitted statement of facts or memorandum of facts thereafter is less than
helpful. Additionally, the affidavit by Mr. Pett does not aid the Court. A statement of facts must
be supported by an affidavit, and moreover, must be material or facts pertinent to the issue at
hand to preclude summary judgment. Though most of the facts contested in Defendant's
statement go to some of the underlying issues, none of them go to the heart of the issue, whether
Defendant is indebted for services received.
Defendant's general argument is that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude
the Court from entering a summary judgment. Specifically, Defendant first asserts Plaintiff was
paid for the medical services provided to Mr. Pett's daughter and therefore, the Plaintiff is not
entitled to summary judgment. Yet, there is no issue of fact with respect to that. The fact
Defendant's daughter received services is undisputed and to suggest that "it is not reasonable or
logical to assume that Mr. Pett's insurance carrier could or would retract a payment it made to
Interwest 384 days earlier, and that Plaintiff offers no explanation as to how Mr. Pett's insurance
-2-

carrier was able to retract a payment it made more than a year earlier," does not necessarily raise
an issue of fact Simply making a blanket assertion that an insurance carrier retracted a payment
does not raise a material issue of fact that Defendant is not obligated for the alleged debt. Some
other questions were raised, but there is nothing therein to argue the central point of whether the
debt was owed The questions raised as to alleged facts without facts to the contrary does not an
issue of fact create.
The second point in the Defendant's argument is that he never signed a contract with
Interwest for any type of services. That is not germain to the issue here. There is no claim that he
signed an agreement with Interwest for the services. The claim is that he owes Interwest sums for
services provided. The rather oblique arguments that the Defendant never received a collection
letter or a pre-collection letter, or was billed on a regular basis, has nothing to do with the
underlying claim here.
The third point made by the Defendant is that he should not be required to pay a debt for
which he has no knowledge of and which should have been, or may have been, paid by his
insurance carrier. There is nothing under that allegation to suggest that in fact he never received
the services. To suggest that he had no knowledge of the debt, or that it may have been paid by
his insurance carrier does not negate the claim by the Plaintiff that the Defendant is indebted and
owes for the services provided.
The fourth argument, similar to the third, suggests that the debt wrongly reflected a
reference to Defendant's son rather than his daughter again fails to raise a material issue of fact.
Defendant was informed in Plaintiffs Complaint of the obligation and Defendant has never denied
in his affidavit or otherwise that the services were provided to his child or that they were
reasonable. The allegation that he was never informed of the obligation and the question as to
-3-

whether Interwest was in fact paid does not an issue of fact create to dispute his underlying
obligation.
Defendant's fifth point is that Interwest is not entitled to an interest rate of 18% or any
attorney's fees Once again, this argument is oblique There is no allegation that Defendant
signed a contract with Interwest or agreed to pay attorney's fees or interest. However, attached
to Plaintiffs affidavit of Wendy Gittins is Defendant's undisputed signed agreement with Cache
Valley Specialty Hospital. That agreement provided for attorney's fees and interest and was
assignable. Not unlike the response to the motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that
both the motions to strike the affidavit of Wendy Gittins and the Objection to Findings of Fact are
without merit.
Thi5 memorandum decision will serve as notice that the Findings, Order and Judgment
submitted fry the Plaintiff have been modified on the first line under findings to provide that:
"The Court finds the defenses raised in the Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition
appear to be without merit."
Otherwise, the findings will remain as entered on the 20th of pecember, 2006.
Counsel for the Plaintiff is now directed to prepare an order denying the motion to strike
and overruling the objection to the findings of fact.
Dated thj»< ^

day of

\ y z ^ r

<0£
BY THE COURT

Jonathan P. Thomas (8513)
JONATHAN P. THOMAS, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiff
31 Federal Avenue
Logan. Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 792-4505
FileNo.:C05-436
Superior No.. 18951

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.,
AFFIDAVIT OF WENDY GITTINS
Plaintiff,
vs.
JAMES PETT,

Case No. 060100241 DC

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Cache

Judge: Gordon J. Low

)
ss.
)

Wendy Gittins, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am a resident of Cache County, State of Utah, I am over the age of 18,1 have

personal knowledge of the following, except where so stated, and I am competent to testify.
2.

I am the office manager of Interwest Anesthesia, a client of Superior Recovery Inc.

(''Superior"'), which means I have access to all account information regarding James Petfs (the
"Defendant") account, aijd that I am a custodian of the records. The records of the Defendant's
account that I reviewed are kept in the course of a regularly conducted business procedure, and it
our regular practice to make memorandums, reports, records, or data compilations.

3.

Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and my review of the Defendant's

account in this matter, I have determined the following:
4.

On or about May 27, 2004, Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the Defendant's

daughter, in Cache County, State of Utah, obtained services and supplies from Interwest
Anesthesia, and the principal charge was $572.00. A copy of the account statement is attached
hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "A. "
5.

The Defendant promised to pay for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the

"Agreement"). A copy of which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit

6.

The Agreement provides that among the services that may be provided are anesthesia.

Please see Exhibit A.
7.

The Agreement provides that Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and

supplies, he is liable for interest at 18% per annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which
includes a collection fee, and the attorney's fees incurred in the collection process. Please see
Exhibit A.
8.

The Agreement states under paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to

pay for all services and supplies rendered to the patient in accordance with the rates and financial
policies in effect at the time of service." Please see Exhibit A.
9.

Paragraph 3 states: "1 understand that 1 am responsible for any and all charges not

covered by my insurance policy(s)." Please see Exhibit A.
JO.

Per the terms of the Agreement, and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is

made whole, a collection charge was added to the account in the amount of $317.57 prior to
referral to Superior. Please see Exhibit A.

11.

The Defendant breached the Agreement by not paying for the services and supplies.

12

On or about July 12, 2004 the Defendant's insurance company, Altius, sent a

payment, in the amount of $334.62, to Interwest Anesthesia. Please see Exhibit A.
13.

However, Altius retracted that payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about

February 25, 2005, Altius paid the Defendant $514.80, to pay for the services and supplies
provide by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's daughter on or about May 27, 2004. Please
see Exhibit A.
14.

We sent statements to the Defendant on a regular basis. On the account statement,

when there is a finance charge, those are the dates that we sent statements. Finally, on
September 1, 2005, Interwest Anesthesia sent a pre-collection letter to the Defendant, which
included a copy of the account statement to day, requesting payment. The Defendant did not
pay. Please see Exhibit A.
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Cache
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Wendy Gittins, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That she has read the above
and foregoing knows the contents thereof and the facts alleged therein are true to her own best
knowledge, understanding that she does so under penalty of jperjura

On the ^Jj_ day of July, 2006, personally appeared before me, Wendy Gittins, the signer
of the written instrument, who duly acknowledged thatjjje executed the same.
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Notary Public
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InterWest Anesthesia Associates
274 N Main St
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA

1/1/2005

r^isi

Patient Ledger Analysis
PETT
Init Bal: S 0.00
Charge Seq. #:

HEATHER
Ins. Bal- $ 0.00
66,006

Charge Amount: $ 572.00
Item# From

To

Patient #: 20,644
Pat. Bal. $ 952.71

Date of Birth 9/16/1993
Phone: (435)512-1821
Total Bal: S 952.71
SSN:

Primary: ALTIUS

ALTIUS

Secondary:

P. Status: Resolved

S. Status:

Attending Physician: JRR

Trans Date 5/27/200

Mod ICD#

Charges Days or Units

POS CPT#

Procedure Description

Charge Balance: S635.14
Trans. Date5/27/2004
Trans. Seq. #: 66006
5/27/2004 5/27/2004 22

Active Charges Only

00170

Source: Charges
INTRAORAL PROCEDURES

Aim:
PI

$572.00

474.10

S572.00
11.00

Trans. Date:! 1/1/2004
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 107253

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$4.60

Trans. Date:l2/1/2004
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 115577

Item#:-1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.70

Trans. Date:l/l/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. *: 123499

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.88

Trans. Date2/l/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 133259

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.94

Trans. DateS/1/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 141287

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.61

Trans. Date:4/l/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. 3: 150429

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$4.05

Trans. Date5/1/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 159975

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$3.98

Trans. Daterf/1/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 169446

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$4.18

Trans. Date:7/l/2005
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 178040

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$4.10

Trans. Date:7/28/2005
Trans. Seq. #: 186218
Item #: 1 Source: Payment - PATIENT
PRI INS Amt:
ALTIUS PAID YOU $514.80 ON 2/25/05. PAYMENT IN FULL IS DUE IMMEDIATELY. ALTIUS IS RETRACTING THE
PAYMENT MADE TO US. PLEASE CONTACT US IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS. THANK YOU!

$0.00

Trans. Date:7/31/2005
Trans. Seq. #: 187320
07/31/05 REFUND ALTIUS CK 5254

Item #: 1 Source: Payment - UNITED UNITED2

R

Amt:

$334.62

Trans. DateS/1 /2005
Interest

Item #. -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$9.42

Source:

PC

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

Trans, Seq. #: 188026

Trans. DateS/1/2005
Trans. Seq. #: 1 ^5723
PRE-COLLECT LETTER SENT
Trans. DateS/1/2005

Trans. Seq. #: 195906

Item #: -1

Amt:

EXHIBIT "A"

$9.56

Run Date: •"

11/1/2005

InterWest Anesthesia Associates
274 N Mam St
Logan, UT 84321-3915 USA
Patient Ledger Analysis

PLT1
Imt Bal: $ 0.00

HEATHER
Ins. Bal: $ 0.00

Patient #: 20,644
Pat. Bal: $ 952 71

Trans. Date£/10/2004
Trans. Seq. #: 67551
Primary Generated. OutputType: PRINTED

Active Charges Onl^

DaieofBmh: 9/16/1993
Phone: (435)512-1821
Total Bal: $ 952.71
SSN:

Source: 1st Carrier Claim Generated: ALTIt

Amt:

Trans. Date:7/12/2004
Trans. Seq. #: 77896
ALTIUS PAYMENTS 6602981

Item U: 1 Source: Payment - ALTIUS ALTIUS

Trans. Date9/1/2004
Interest

Trans Seq. #• 89602

Item #• -I

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$7.2t

Trans. Date:l 0/1/2004
Interest

Trans. Seq. #: 99069

Item #: -1

Source: Adjustment - PATIENT

FINANCE Amt:

$0.8^

Charge Seq. #:

212,619

Primary:

Charge Amount: S 317.57

P. Status:

Item# From

To

PQS CPT #

Charge Balance: S317.57
Trans. Date:l 1/1/2005
Trans. Seq. #: 212619
11/1/2005 11/1/2005 22

COLL

PRI INS

Amt:

($334.6

Secondary:
S. Status:
Procedure Description

Attending Physician: JRR
Mod ICD 4

Source: Charges
ACCOUNT TO COLLECTIONS

'Trans. Date: 11/1/200
,

Charges Days or Unit
Amt:

0

$317 57

$317.57
1.0C
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Consent and Conditions of Treatment

*TS

peciajiy n<^uual

Thank you for choosing Cache Valley Speciality Hospital to provide for your hcaJthcarc needs. Wc arc committed to providing exceptional healthcare. The first step in this process is to provide information regarding patient riglits, risks and responsibilities. The second step is to obtain youi
consenr to Treat the patient. The admitting staff can answer any questions you may have in recordc tr> tH~ #J!rn«i«« « ~ ~ ~ , ~ Cache Vulley Specialty Hospital
J agre. to the f o l d i n g :

S

S

™

™

* . CYOn

DLOTTEK M.D .JAMES W.

DOS Ob/27/QA

I. CONSENT TO TREAT: I consent to tbe treatment or admission of
ss* ooc-oc-OOOO
*# cvowaa^i
at Cache Valley Speciality Hospital for services or supplies that have been or may oc uraerea oy a licensed professional healthcare provider.
I understand that treatment may include but is not limited to; radiological examinations, laboratory procedures, physical therapy, anesthesia, nursing care or medical and surgical treatment. I understand that all licensed professional healthcare providers that render service to the
patient arc responsible and liable for their own acts, orders and omissions, 1 acknowledge that the hospital has not made nor can it make a
guarantee of the outcome of treatment.
2.

FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies rendered to thc patient in accordance with the rates and financial
policies in effect at thc time of service. 1 authorize any overpayment made on this account to be transferred to any other account balance for
which I am responsible. I agree to pay interest fees on any unpaid balance after 60 days of discharge or date of service at a rate not to exceed
18% apr, If this account is assigned to an attorney or a collection agency for collection then I agree to pay ail collection agency fees, court
cants, and attorney's fees.

3. ASSIGNMENT OF INSURANCE BENEFITS; I assign and authorize payment directly to Cache Valley Specialty Hospital of any healthcare benefits that tile patient is entitled to receive. This assignment will not be withdrawn or voided at any time unless I pay the account in
full. I understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not covered by my insurance policy(s). If thc patient is entitled to Medicare
or Medicaid benefits under Title XVI11 of thc Social Security Act, I request assignment of benefits directly to Cache Valley Speciality
Hospital.
4. ASSIGNMENT OF PHYSICIAN BENEFITS: I am aware that physician services by Radiologist, Pathologist, Anesthesiologist, as well
as medical, surgical and emergency care arc not billed by the hospital but are billed separately. I understand that 1 am under thc same obligation to those providers as stated in thb agreement unless otherwise agreed to in writing with those providers. I authorize payment of any
medical benefits for such claims to the appropriate provider,.
5. RELEASE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION: I authorize the hospital or any professional healthcare provider who rendered services to
the patient to release any medical or odier information necessary to process claims.
6. PERSONAL VALUABLES AND BELONGINGS: I understand that thc hospital maintains a safe for the protection of valuables. I agree
that the hospital is not responsible for the Joss or damage of any article or personal property unless they are deposited in the safe and a receipt
issued.
7. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE/LIVING WILL; Federal Law requires that the hospital provide ail adult patients with information about their
right to make an Advanced Directive or Living Will. Please mark one of thc following!
Q The patient has a Living Will or Durable Power of Attorney and requests that a copy be placed in their medical jecord.
Copy available irom;
_—«_________.
D The patient requests information in regards to their right to make advance healthcare directives.
J*K~The patient declines information in regards to their right to make advance healthcare directives.
Action taken by admission clerk:.
8. RIGHT TO DONATE ORGANS: The patient understands that they have a right to donate organs and they have discussed their decision
with their family. Should circumstances arise please do (he following:
Q Sjj$ak with the family regarding the matter.
Ek^fnc patient does "NOT wish to donate. Please DO NOT Speak with the family in regards lo thc mailer.
I understand and accept tbe terms of this agreement and certify that I am duly authorized by thc patient or by law to extcute the above
agreement in their behalL

Patient //&MJ*~
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Patient's Guardian or Representative

Date
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Witness

EXHIBIT "B
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Charles A. Schultz (4760)
Attorney for James E. Pett
222 West 700 South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Phone: 435.225.2636

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, LOGAN DEPARTMENT

SUPERIOR RECOVERY SERVICE, INC.,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE THEAFFIDA VIT
OF WENDY GITTINS

VS.

JAMES E. PETT,
Defendant.

Case No. 060100241 DC
Judge: Gordon J. Low

COMES NOW, James Pett and submits the following Memorandum in Support of this
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Wendy Gittins (hereinafter "Gittins',).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. In paragraph 3, page 2. of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal

knowledge, memory, and review of the Defendant's account in this matter, I have determined the
following:"
2. In paragraph 4, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about May 27, 2004,
Heather Pett, born September 16, 1999, the defendant's daughter, in Cache County, State of Utah
obtained services and supplies from Interwest Anesthesia, and the principal charge was $572.00. "
3. In paragraph 5, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant promised to pay
for these services and supplies, signed a contract (the "Agreement").
A. In paragraph 6, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides that
among other services that may be provided are anesthesia. "
5. In paragraph 7, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement provides that
Defendant, in addition to paying for the service and supplies, he is liable for interest at 18% per
annum, court costs, the costs of collection, which includes a collection fee, and attorney's fees
incurred in the collection process. "
6. In paragraph 85 page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Agreement states under
paragraph 2: FINANCIAL AGREEMENT: I agree to pay for all services and supplies rendered to
the patient in accordance with the rates and financial policies in effect at the time of service. "
7. In paragraph 9, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Paragraph 3 states: "I
understand that I am responsible for any and all charges not covered by my insurance policy(s). "
8. In paragraph 10, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Per the terms of the Agreement,

-ii-

and in order to make sure that Interwest Anesthesia is made whole, a collection charge was added
to the account in the amount of $317.57prior to referral to Superior. "
9. In paragraph 11, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "The Defendant breached the
Agreement by not paying for the services and supphes. "
10. In paragraph 12, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "On or about July 12, 2004 the
Defendant's insurance company Altius, sent a payment, in the amount of $334.62, to Interwest
Anesthesia. "
11. In paragraph 13, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "However, Altius retracted that
payment on July 31, 2005, because on or about February 25, 2005, Altius paid the Defendant
$514.80, to pay for the services and supplies provided by Interwest Anesthesia to the Defendant's
daughter on or about May 27, 2004. "
12. In paragraph 14, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "We sent statements to the
Defendant on a regular basis. On the account statement, when there is a finance charge, those
dates that we sent statements. Finally, on September 2005, Interwest Anesthesia sent a precollection letter to the defendant, which included a copy of the account statement to day,
requesting payment. "

-in-

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE GITTINS AFFIDAVIT DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE EXPRESS
PROVISIONS OF RULE 56(e) URCP, IT MUST BE STRICKEN.
9

In pertinent part, Rule 56(e) URCP, (hereinafter "Rule 56"), provides as follows:
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. (Emphasis added).
Gittins' affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56. Therefore, it must
be stricken.
In paragraph 3, page 2, of her affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal knowledge,
memory, and review of the Defendant's account in this matter... " Gittins5 memory and review of
the Defendant's account is not personal knowledge as mandated by Rule 56. Gittins' "review of
the Defendant's account in this matter" does not qualify as personal knowledge. While Mr. Pett's
account, so long as it contains only documents prepared and kept in the ordinary course of
business may be admissible, does not mean that Mr. Pett's account is within Gittins' personal
knowledge, and Gittins cannot base her affidavit on her personal interpretation of the alleged
contents of Mr. Pett's account. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based on her alleged
(t

review of the Defendant's account in this matter... " is improper testimony in an affidavit and

must be stricken.

-1-

Likewise, any of Gittins5 statements in her Affidavit based on her alleged "review of the
Defendant 's account in this matter... " must be stricken because her affidavit does not contain
"Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit " as mandated
by Rule 56. Therefore, any portion of her affidavit that is based on her alleged "review of the
Defendant's account in this matter... " is improper testimony in an affidavit and must be stricken.
All of Gittins' affidavit after paragraph 3 must be stricken because all of those subsequent
paragraphs are her personal conclusions, and affidavits must be based on personal knowledge of
facts not conclusions. As previously set forth in this Memorandum, in paragraph 3, page 2, of her
affidavit Gittins states: "Based upon my personal knowledge, memory, and review of the
Defendant's account in this matter, I have determined the following:"
Gittins is unequivocally stating that everything in her affidavit after paragraph 3 is
something that she has personally determined, not that she knows, not even something that she
believes she may remember, but something that she has determined. Rule 56 does not permit
affidavits to be based on a person's opinion, conclusions or determinations. Because Gittins
unequivocally states that everything in her affidavit after paragraph 3 is something that she has
determined, paragraphs 5 through 14 of her affidavit must be stricken.

CONCLUSION
Because Gittins affidavit is not based on personal knowledge, as required by Rule 56, it
must be stricken. Because paragraphs 4 through 14 or her affidavit are, by her own admission, her
-2-

personal determination, rather than statements of fact based on her personal knowledge,
paragraphs 4 through 14 or her affidavit must be stricken as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court
must grant Mr. Pett's Motion to Strike and strike paragraphs 4 through 14 or Gittins' affidavit.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August 2006.

-/

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for James E. Pett

